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This paper challenges the mainstream social scientiﬁc approach that emphasizes “moral
inferiority” in corruption and bribery in Central and Eastern Europe. We argue that in
many cases, people participate in informal organizational resource exchanges not because
of immorality or greed but rather because of powerful external forces. By using the case of
contemporary Hungary to support this argument, this paper provides a systematic analysis
of such imperatives. The ﬁndings of 50 in-depth qualitative interviews suggest that two
main imperatives can be distinguished; macro-level social and meso-level organizational
forces. Macro-level forces may be linked to historical paths, Hungary's socialist and pre-
socialist social conditions, and its post-socialist welfare state development. Meso-level
organizational forces are more general phenomena and can be found in many other
countries in the world. Moreover, there are numerous categories within each theme. Some
of them represent normative imperatives, while others are more material structural forces.
Copyright © 2014, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is often
labeled by Western scholars as a “highly corrupt” realm
outside modern and civilized Western-style democracies
(Shore & Haller, 2005: 3e4). According to this notion, the
main reasons of corruption in the “developing world” are
moral inferiority and the lack of “social discipline” (Sajo,
2002: 9e10). This paper challenges this universal under-
standing of post-socialist corruption and claims that
informal transactions to exchange organizational resources
in the region should not be considered as primarily a
matter of individual morality or character. These trans-
actions are complex and should not be seen as a general or
single phenomenon. In this paper I argue that in manyarch Center, Hanyang
nter, Hanyang University. Prodcases such informal behavior is the result of structural ar-
rangements that manifest themselves as imperatives on
individuals. The main goal of this paper is to map out the
varieties of such external forces by using rich empirical
materials. I use the case of Hungary, a country that has led
the way of ‘Europeanization’ in the post-socialist bloc, to
support my argument. The ﬁndings suggest that even in
democratic and relatively well-to-do Hungary, people face
strong external imperatives to get involved in everyday
informal transactions.
Based on qualitative empirical data (50 in depth-
interviews) this paper identiﬁes two patterns, macro-level
social and meso-level organizational structural forces, that
ordinary citizens face. The ﬁrst one may be linked to his-
torical paths, Hungary's socialist or even pre-socialist social
conditions and its post-socialist welfare state development,
while the second, organizational pattern and the related
subcategories may be similar to those found in many other
parts of the world. By using conceptual “additions” fromuction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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qualitative perspective, this paper provides an under-
standing of informal and illicit practices in post-socialist
CEE deeper than the over-simplistic “moral inferiority”
approach. The two research questions of this paper are:
What are the main types of imperatives that “force” people
to participate in informal exchanges of organizational re-
sources in contemporary Hungary? What are the possible
explanations of the existence of such imperatives?
This article is organized as follows. The second section
provides the conceptual framework of the paper. The third
section (methodology) discusses the sampling and data
gathering strategy of the study and shows how the
empirical data was analyzed. It also deals with some
drawbacks of snowball sampling, used for this study, and
other potential weaknesses of this type of qualitative
research. In the fourth and ﬁfth sections I present the main
ﬁndings of the study. Finally, the conclusion summarizes
the results and attempts to place the main ﬁndings in a
broader social and historical context.
2. Conceptual preliminaries
In a very general sense, informal economic practices are
deﬁned as activities that are not ‘regulated, monitored or
controlled directly or indirectly by the state’ (Routh, 2011:
211). In this case “formal” is deﬁned in terms of state in-
stitutions and “informal” is simply just outside of the state's
regulatory regime. In contrast to this approach, I try to cap-
ture the “formal-informal” dichotomy at the organizational
level. This study deﬁnes “formal” activity as tasks, roles and
resource transfers assigned by formal organizational au-
thorities and regulated by formal rules within an organiza-
tion. Such activities are fostered and coordinated in order to
achieve the organizations' ofﬁcial goal (Puranam, Alexy, &
Reitzig, 2014). This paper focuses on cases when people
informally exchange formally allocated organizational re-
sources. The “re-distribution” of these resources should be
considered, atminimum, as the violation of rules of the focal
organization. However, since society wide codiﬁed norms
are typically reinforced by internal organizational rules
(Martin, Lopez, Roscigno,&Hodson,2013), inmanycases the
informal organizational resource exchanges, examined in
this study, also break the society's universal rules.
In the literature there is a gift-bribe debate, in which
activity, viewed as gift giving by anthropologists, are
regarded as corrupt by NGOs and international institutions
(Morris & Polese, 2014; Polese, 2008; Rose-Ackerman,
2010). The activity I discuss in this paper has similar char-
acters to gift giving, because of the norm of reciprocity and
the absence of moral violation of norms from local
perspective. However, the fact that actors exchange orga-
nizational resources that they do not own clearly distin-
guishes this behavior from pure forms of gift giving when
actors exchange things belong to them. The presence of
organizational resources, usually counter-gifts, in the ex-
change may help to clarify such ambiguity and distinct
informal exchange of organizational resources from typical
gift giving.
The activity discussed in this paper is traditionally un-
derstood as corruption or bribery, both in terms of politicalscience, sociology and organization studies conception, and
in a lay context. However since many of my respondents
found such behavior legitimate and appropriate, from their
perspective it was not necessarily deﬁned as “corrupt.” In
other cases, my interviewees saw the inappropriateness of
their behavior, but had to obey much stronger social forces
that somewhat legitimated or at least made their rule-
breaking act ethically neutral (Humphrey, 2002: 128).
Dominant social scientiﬁc approaches often use a
framework to analyze corruption with strong moralistic
and ethnocentric undertones (Anders & Nuijten, 2008).
These scholars treat corruption in more developedWestern
countries as something exceptional, caused only by a few
“rotten apples” while they claim that the structural cor-
ruption in the less developed parts of theworld is the result
of society wide moral inferiority. The hardworking and
sober West is contrasted here with deceptive, savage and
lazy East. This social-pathological approach views corrup-
tion as a cancer, harmful and dysfunctional. By analyzing
corruption at the level of transactions this view argues that
individuals participate in such exchanges because they are
greedy and want to maximize their personal proﬁt
(Banﬁeld, 1975; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Shleifer & Vishny,
1993). However, the social-pathological approach rarely
considers the actors' social context, past and current re-
lationships, and their complex normative preferences.
Of course, some studies have conﬁrmed less voluntary
forms of corruption. Here people participate in corruption
not because of greed and proﬁt maximization but because
of external imperatives. For example, in several cases the
payment is demanded rather than offered because corrupt
individuals, usually public ofﬁcials, use their authority and
their monopolistic control over resources to force ordinary
citizens to pay bribes (Granovetter, 2007). Other studies
have considered less individual forms of constraints,
norms in rule-breaking behavior. According to such
models, the willingness of participants to violate rules re-
ﬂects lenient social norms that people internalized in the
countries where they grew up (Barr & Serra, 2010; Fisman
& Miguel, 2008: 82e94). In these cases local actors do not
see their activity as deviant or unusual but rather some-
thing as unquestionable part of their everyday life. For
example, empirical studies conﬁrmed that most patients in
Hungary feel obliged to give informal payment for health
care even if the doctor does not ask for anything (Gaal,
2006).
This paper delves deeper inside into such external im-
peratives and focuses on transactions when economic
reasoning was not the major motivator but rather actors
were somewhat compelled to engage in illegal exchange.
The main goal of this study is to create a typology of this
speciﬁc form of informal exchanges when actors' behavior
is constrained by external social forces. However, external
imperatives are never entirely external. Rather they inﬂu-
ence individual behavior via personal relationship struc-
tures. Such constraints are not static “social facts” but
should be seen as constant processes, continuously con-
structed, reconstructed, and altered during interactions
with other people (Emirbayer, 1997). This study tries to
capture these imperatives through personal narratives
about actual informal transactions.
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between symbolic segments of social forces including cul-
tural, normative or institutional elements and other, “more
materially constrained levels and imperatives of the social
system” (Alexander & Smith, 1993). These two types are
often referred inmacro sociology as ideational andmaterial
structural forces (Adler & Borys, 1993; Collins, 2005: 133;
Hinings & Tolbert, 2008: 475e476; Lincoln & Guillot,
2006). My study applies this distinction to argue that
these two forms of imperatives, institutional and material
forces, should also be separated in the analysis of informal
exchanges.
3. Methodology
I conducted 50 in-depth interviews in Hungarian in
Budapest between December 2009 and May 2011. Using
snowball sampling, I interviewed people from widely
different social and organizational backgrounds who had
themselves participated in informal and illegal transactions
or at least had a direct insight into the phenomenon.
Snowball sampling is an appropriate technique to identify
hidden target populations, for example,members of deviant
or vulnerable social groups (Becker, 1966; Goodman, 1961;
Heckathorn, 1997; Lindesmith, 1968).
I conducted semi-structured interviews, using a ﬂexible
interview protocol that allowed me to tailor my research
questions to each interview situation. My main goal was to
collect detailed descriptions of actual transactions when
people informally exchanged organizational resources. I
had 10 initial starting contacts, drawing upon a deliberately
wide spectrum of people from low-level private employees
to top executives of national governmental organizations,
based on my own social networks of friends and friends of
friends.
I deﬁned the interviewees' social economic status based
on their education and occupation. I classiﬁed as working-
class those respondents who did not have college degrees
and who were manual workers or low-level administrative
workers. Interviewees that I described as ‘middle class’ had
at least a college degree and typically held professional or
white-collar jobs. Respondents whom I categorized as ‘elite
members’ were top executives in either private, state
owned or governmental organizations. The respondents I
labeled ‘small entrepreneurs’ ﬁt the upper scale of working
class category. They are typically self-employed, small shop
owners or small-entrepreneurs with very few employees,
often relatives. They often ﬁnanced their families directly
from their business accounts. Table 1 summarizes the
backgrounds of my respondents.Table 1
Social background of all respondents.
Social background N %
Elite 13 26
Middle-class 12 24
Entrepreneur 9 18
Working-class 9 18
Lower working-class 3 6
Investigative journalist 4 8
Total 50 100As the ﬁrst analytical step of this study, I established
discrete ﬁndings based onmy interviews. Then I related my
ﬁndings to each other in order to recognize categories and
broader patterns. Finally I made conceptual “additions”
from existing social scientiﬁc literature tomy observed data
(Miles, Matthew, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014: 293). Many
of my ﬁndings have conceptual analog, although in
different social scientiﬁc disciplines. My study follows a
bottom-up or inductive analytical strategy by focusing on
“the context of discovery” instead of the “context of justi-
ﬁcation” (Swedberg, 2012). Therefore this research did not
start with clearly deﬁned hypotheses nor already existing
theories. I rather looked for similar behavior patterns and
related categories emerged from the rich empirical data.
However, in each section I tried to pick up appropriate
conceptual constructs from the literature. Linking my data
to these concepts, now empirically grounded in a Central
and Eastern European context, helps to better understand
informal practices in the post-socialist region from the
viewpoint of everyday Hungarians.
I started the data analysis while interviews were still
being conducted and created verbatim transcripts based on
recordings. I usedqualitative codingof transcripts to identify
connections between the narratives and the codes
(Charmaz, 2006: 43). By the end of my analysis, I had con-
structed a list of core categories, theoretical memos, as well
as representative examples of quotes from interviews and,
ﬁnally, a portrait of how different types of constraints in-
ﬂuence actors. I use nearly verbatim quotes to illustrate my
categories. This study focuses only on cases when the “sold”
resources can be found at the middle or lower levels of or-
ganizations. In contrast to this phenomenon, professionally
designed and managed hybrid formal/informal organiza-
tions such as of corrupt elite networks in Hungary have
signiﬁcantlydifferent characteristics (Jancsics& Javor, 2012).
Snowball sampling is not without problems. Since the
actual size and boundaries of a hidden population are
unknown, new respondents cannot be selected at
random (Heckathorn, 1997). They are somewhat depen-
dent on the individual and subjective choice of the previous
interviewee. This selection bias obviously decreases the
validity of the sample and limits the author's ability to end
up with general conclusions from the sample (Faugier,
1997). Research projects relying on snowball sampling
may be also stuck in close-knit subgroups and the ﬁndings
could exaggerate similar features within the group while
denying subjects outside the cohesive network (Grifﬁths,
Gossop, & Powis, 1993). Although the researcher has
some control to direct the sampling process, for example,
by selecting among the newly suggested respondents, the
above-mentioned methodological weaknesses can be only
partially addressed. However after considering the tradeoff
between the unique insight of a hidden population and
selection biases, I believe that the beneﬁts that the snow-
ball method provides in this case, are clearly greater than
the drawbacks.
4. Macro-level imperatives
This pattern refers to macro-level social forces. All of
them are somewhat related to Hungary's long-term or
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imperatives shape the behavior of the actors who usually
do not perceive the effects of the institutions they have
created (Hall& Taylor, 1996). This means that the process of
their creation and the behavior linked to them are not
based on purposive human action. After people internalize
social norms, they no longer recognize the social constraint
of such institutionalized system as a burden but instead see
it as totally normal or natural, something common to all
group members (Cloyd, 1965; Granovetter, 1985). In
contrast to these normative constraints, material impera-
tives are more visible and real. Here ordinary people are
aware of the pressure that forces them to participate in
informal organizational exchanges. Such constraints are
related to their actual position in society.
4.1. Universalistic norms
Two categories, ‘consume more’ and ‘Robin Hood atti-
tude,’ emerged frommy data that suggest that society-wide
universalistic norms, or at least norms shared by large
groups of Hungarians, play a role in informal practices. Both
reﬂect somewhat the historical context of informality in
the region.
Consume more. During communism consumption had a
special importance in peoples' life. Due to the malfunctions
of the socialist redistributive economy, citizens in CEE faced
widespread constant shortages and even the available
goods had very limited variety (Kornai, 1959). Consuming
Western goods, for example wearing blue jeans, was a
means of symbolic resistance against the socialist homog-
enization pressure and provided important identity that set
somebody apart from socialism (Verdery, 1996: 28e29).
More contemporary empirical research conﬁrmed that
high visible consumption as a status signal has much more
importance in poor countries. The richer a society or social
group, the less important visible spending becomes
(Charles, Hurst,& Roussanov, 2009). My interviews suggest
that consumption is still a crucial element of contemporary
post-socialist life in Hungary. Strong universal informal
norms pushing people to consume at higher and higher
levels often overwrite more formalized and codiﬁed legal
laws.
My Hungarian interviewees repeatedly compared their
own living standards with those in neighboring Western
European countries. They desired a level of consumption
similar to that of an average Austrian or German, but they
were painfully aware of their signiﬁcantly lower salaries
and standard of living in Hungary. Of course using informal
exchanges is only one of several ways people satisfy their
consumer demand in Hungary. For example, before the
global ﬁnancial crisis, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians
had become indebted in foreign currencies and bought new
apartments, cars and other consumer goods for credit. Now
most of those people are heavily burdened by the sky-
rocketing interest payments triggered by the crisis. Since
cheap credit is not available for consumption anymore,
informal activities are on the rise again in Hungary. This
echoes the similar pattern in other post-socialist countries
that the crisis has exacerbated informal behavior (Polese,
Morris, Nodelsen, & Kovacs, 2014).Other legal options to achieve high-level consumption
are rather limited. For example, compared to the last two
decades of socialism, people in post-communist Hungary
have faced fewer opportunities for upward mobility or
increased earnings. Democratic Hungary has become more
andmore immobile and one's parents' social status strongly
determines children's career opportunities (Bukodi, 2002).
My research suggests that, in this economically-constricted
post-socialist context, informal exchange has become a
legitimate mobility channel for both working-class and
middle class Hungarians. Because legal channels for
attaining prosperity are not functioning for many people,
these transactions provide a real alternative tool to express,
achieve and maintain social status. Respondents explained
how illicit exchanges might contribute to consumption
based social status:
“In order to feel that you are in the right position in society
you should change your car every two or three years … or
if you do not have an LCD TV at home you are not even a
human … and of course there are the ‘required’ holidays.
You cannot provide all of these from your salary so you
have to do something illegal to achieve such goals. But this
is normal in Hungary today.” (Middle-class respondent)
Or
“If you are a youngster in Hungary, I know because I see
my brother, and you earn 83 000 forint (approximately
$380) a month and work at a CBA [Hungarian retailer
chain] or in a shop the public transportation is 11 000 for a
month. Ok, let's say you don't pay rent because you live
with your parents. But you have to give them 10 000 or
15 000. So, 50 000 is left; but a pair of trendy jeans is
22 000. So buy one and 30 000 is left for a month to eat and
to go out and invite your girlfriend to see a movie and to
pay your cell phone bill. I don't know anybody in Budapest
now who would not be corrupt in order to afford such a
normal life of a young person. So, they just steal whatever
they can from their workplace and sell it.” (Working-class
respondent)
‘Robin Hood’ attitude. Not only the current situation nor
organizational rules, but also the particular history of an
exchange relation structure, may determine what is
considered appropriate in illicit exchanges (Granovetter,
2007). In CEE the heritage of socialist states had a long-
standing impact. Under Communism, informal and illegal
activities became tolerated ways of beating the unpopular
Communist system or ways of defying greedy politicians
(Ledeneva, 1998). We can see that historical relationships
between citizens and the ruling party also matter. These
strong historical pathways still inﬂuence ordinary citizens'
perception of the state. My ﬁndings suggest that a wide-
spread norm among many Hungarians that supports
informal exchanges is the belief that cheating the state is
acceptable. In my interviews, the most typical ration-
alization was that the state and state authorities constitute
an alien body imposed on Hungarian society and since the
Hungarian state steals from its own people, stealing (back)
from the state is totally legitimate. Some interviewees even
compared cheating the state to Robin Hood's heroic acts:
robbing from the rich and giving to the poor.
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on tax payments because he cannot pay it all. Entrepre-
neurs such as him have this Robin Hood feeling… and they
say: this f***ing state wants to steal my money because the
taxes are huge. But the state cannot mess with me because
this is me whowill cheat the state. I will do tax evasion, use
fake receipts and so on. I know because had the same
feeling when I used to be a self-employed entrepreneur
years ago.” (Middle-class respondent)
Or
“The state here did not give too much to the Hungarian
people. After the collapse of the communist system I did
not get anything from these new ‘democratic’ governments
such that I should be loyal with them. They were and still
are massively corrupt. And people just think, why not; why
not cheat the state?” (Working-class respondent)
Or
“I think the main point of the Hungarian history, for a very
long time, has been about cheating the central power … if
we wanted to survive … So, the name of the game was
cheating the Turkish when they were here or cheating the
Habsburgs when they were here … You could not choose
the legal ways. The 1950s was the same; it was like
everybody against the communist state because the state
and its regulations were unpredictable.” (Middle-class
respondent)
Robin Hood attitudes reveal unique characteristics of
the post-communist transition and the relation between
Hungarian citizens and the state. Communist public ad-
ministrations were originally designed for imposition and
control rather than facilitation and service (Baker, 2002;
Ellison, 2007). After the collapse of communist regimes,
newly emerged “law governed” states in the region quickly
lost their legitimacy because of their “maﬁotic” and pred-
atory characters (Verdery, 1996: 220e227). Extortion by
post-communist public ofﬁcials is widespread in Central
and Eastern Europe (Kotchegura, 2004; Miller, Grodeland,
& Koshechkina, 2001: 83e85; Sajo, 2002), which also
contributes to the fact that cheating the state is viewed as
absolutely legitimate among ordinary people. In CEE, peo-
ple's trust in institutions such as the political parties, the
government, and Parliament is exceptionally low,
compared to their Western counterparts, even more than
20 years after the collapse of communist state (Radai &
Toth, 2010).
Rationalization is an important reinforcing mechanism
that underlies normalization illicit transactions (Ashforth&
Anand, 2003; Granovetter, 2007; Sykes & Matza, 1957).
Robin Hood attitudes may be also seen as parts of ratio-
nalizing ideologies developed by large social groups in
contemporary Hungary. One rationalization pattern that
seems to be relevant here from the literature is the denial of
victim when the actors believe that the target, in our case,
the Hungarian state, “deserved it” because of previous
unfair treatment of its own citizens. Therefore cheating the
state is a form of revenge (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). My
empirical data suggest another rationalization form, social
weighting (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Sykes & Matza, 1957)when actors, involved in informal behavior, question the
legitimacy of the state, claiming that that politicians and
state ofﬁcers are even more corrupt than ordinary citizens
and thereby stealing from them is legitimate.
4.2. Material structural imperatives
For most participants in illicit exchanges, material im-
peratives are more visible and real than normative ones.
Such constraints are related to the actors' actual position in
society or their relationwith the formal state structure. This
is the realm of unequal power relationships.
I cannot afford not to violate rules. In this category,
informal exchange provides the only solution for everyday
problems that an actor can ﬁnancially afford. For example, a
person's low socioeconomic status may prevent them from
purchasing goods or services at the normal market price;
however, informal dealing works as the equivalent of
buying at a discount. Here such exchange is a strategy of
personal survival. The lowest and most vulnerable stratum
of the working class is redundant workers (Portes, 2010:
88e89). They drift from one menial job to another or are
simply excluded from the regular labor market. Their pri-
mary focus is on day-to-day survival and they often engage
in informal and illegal economic activities. The prime
characteristic of this class is its complete lack of economic
power.
Several interviewees mentioned that they “cannot
afford not to be corrupt.” For example, a working-class
interviewee told me that some services, necessary for his
everyday job, are beyond his budget. He has to choose
illegal ways to obtain such services and such demand cre-
ates its supply in the informal/illegal market. Here is an
example:
“OK. I'm not a corrupt guy but I can solve some difﬁculties
… actually I have to. If my old car has to go through the
yearly inspection test, I just call some friends and they ﬁnd
me a corrupt car inspection service. Let's say there is a
crack on the windshield. An average guy like me is strug-
gling with money problems. A new windshield is 20 000
HUF and we are not even talking about the worn tires and
brake shoes. If I bribe the guy to pass my car through the
inspection, it costs only 8000. I need the car every day to
get to work.” (Working-class respondent)
Or
“You know we travel all around the neighboring towns …
we do not work just in Budapest. Especially in the evening I
drive the minivan fast because everybody wants to get
home rapidly. So every two or three months they [police]
catch us speeding. Thank God so far we were able to get off
by bribing them. We pool our money together. It is some-
times one day's salary for two people. It is a little scary now
because there is much more severe control over them [po-
licemen] by their bosses. So they are reluctant to take the
risk and receive bribes. But I have to take the risk because
this [driving license] is my working tool. I cannot afford not
to be corrupt (laughing).” (Working-class respondent)
Dysfunctional post-socialist institutions. Several authors
argue that informal networks sometimes stem from
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(Ledeneva, 1998; Lomnitz, 1988; Lomnitz & Sheinbaum,
2004; Smart & Hsu, 2008). Such “private-order arrange-
ments” are developed to substitute public-order institutions
in societies where formal arrangements do not function
effectively (Hillmann, 2013). My interviews also conﬁrmed
that people develop informal structures to survive in an
uncertain formal institutional context. Such uncertainties
have derived from the over-politicized public administration
or from theweakpost-socialist judicial system. The following
patterns emerged from interviews with professionals and
academics that worked in ministries and other public sector
organizations. Here political party afﬁliation and sympathy
determine job placements and resource allocations in almost
all public institutions at both the national and local levels.
Each new government, after coming to power, ﬁres a signif-
icant portion of the administrative staff, even at lower
managerial layers, and replaces themwithpeople loyal to the
party in power. This makes any individual's bureaucratic
career extremely uncertain. A middle-level professional at
the Ministry of Education explained this phenomenon:
“Only two of us survived the government change in our
department. They kept me here because I am the only one
who is capable of managing EU grants. But they ﬁred
everybody else. Even the cleaning woman was selected
because of her party loyalty.” (Middle-class respondent)
In order to reduce this uncertainty, Hungarian middle
class professionals cultivate reciprocal networks of inﬂu-
ence, so that they can gain help if they fall out of favor. They
do favors for one another to cement these networks.
Cultivating one's network is a kind of long-term invest-
ment: participants do not usually require immediate pay-
ment for doing a favor for someone. They are content to pile
up IOUs. While such informal networks can be found in any
part of the world, they are more widespread in post-
communist countries than in capitalist ones (Sik &
Wellman, 1999).
“It is like: When somebody is dropped out of the public
administration, he needs a job in the private sector. When
you work for the state you obviously need contacts, ‘good’
men, acquaintances, wives, friends and friends of friends
when the cleaning comes … and the cleaning has always
come since 1998 when Hungary's extreme political po-
larization started. This is a permanent movement of people
among public, private and nonproﬁt sector organizations.
You need the safety function of this social network if you
want to survive. Since you can be ﬁred anytime, you have
to give favors when you are a decision maker in order to
guarantee your next job.” (Middle-class respondent)
Or
“It is an informal thing between different divisions of the
[government] administration and private enterprises.
Today I invite you for a beer and tomorrow you invite me to
drink something. But in our case the beer is paid by the
state which means it is paid by the tax payers.” (Middle-
class respondent)
Post-socialist judicial systems proved to be exception-
ally slow that could not guarantee rapid and unbiasedresolutions of disputes (Verdery, 1996: 221e222). In-
terviews also conﬁrmed the very high uncertainty in
contemporary Hungarian courts. In such context entre-
preneurs try to ﬁnd mechanisms outside the legal system
to reduce the risks of opportunistic behavior by the other
contractual party.
“Listen, even a signed contract does not matter. It
happened to me several times. I did the work and the
contracting party said: I will not pay you; sue me if you
want and maybe after eight years you can get something
back. So, now I am constantly corrupting people at the
contracting company because it means a guarantee for me.
The guy will do everything to force his company to pay me
on time because this is the only way he can get his bribe
money from me. After the company pays me, I pay him.”
(Entrepreneur respondent)
Companies often use their power over their suppliers
and smaller ﬁrms or entrepreneurs regarding the timing of
payment for completed work or services. They pay much
later for the completed work than was speciﬁed in the
contract. After work has already been done and a
contractor has sent an invoice to its business partner, the
contractor also has an obligation to pay the invoice's tax
portion immediately to the tax authority. This makes the
contractor's position against the more powerful partner
even more vulnerable.
“Not paying on time is the most natural thing in Hungary.
Firms do not always do this because they want to mess
with you. They do it just because they are also waiting for
money from other ﬁrms. There is long queue and there is a
hierarchy in it. It is a bad and inadequately functioning
system. If you want to get your money within seven days
what is actually in your contract and not after six months
or even later you have to bribe somebody to put your in-
voice before others. Or you have to give him a generous gift,
an expensive concert ticket or a pass to the coolest summer
festival, for example.” (Entrepreneur respondent)5. Organizational-level imperatives
The second major pattern emerged from my qualitative
data reﬂects meso-level organizational imperatives. They
are probably common features of all hierarchical organi-
zations. Here we can also distinguish normative and
material forces.
5.1. Particularistic norms
Don't turn in an in-group mate. People also engage in
illicit transactions when particularistic norms, related to
small groups, predominate over society-wide codiﬁed
norms (Schweitzer, 2004). A formal organization itself is a
particularistic structure within society but there are also
particularistic informal subgroups with their own goals
behind the organization's formal universalistic regulatory
regime (Blau, 1955: 178e182; Perrow, 2007: 29e30). In
these subgroups unofﬁcial norms regulate, reward and
sanction themembers' behavior (Blau, 1955: 183e195). The
enforcement of external regulations within an organization
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silence and cover-up, where even honest members show
solidarity with their deviant colleagues (Katz, 1977, 1979).
The informal code of “don't give up another cop” is a well-
known example within police forces (Kappeler, Sluder, &
Alpert, 1994). The enforcement of the organization's own
ofﬁcial regulations may be also problematic because of
particularistic structures taboos on reporting fellow group
members. The group can sanction the violation of this norm
by harsh ostracism (Blau, 1955: 188).
Organizational insiders often socialize newcomers to the
organization into rule breaking and produce a local culture
in which deviation from formal rules and procedures is
normal and acceptable (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Vaughan,
1996). A local government ofﬁcial in Budapest told me how
he was socialized in a corrupt organizational culture:
“In our ofﬁce everybody knows about the others' dirty
businesses. When I started to work at the local govern-
ment it was not like an occult initiation to the corrupt
tribe. I just simply saw how things were going on around
me. I just joined the line and that time I did not even think
about it. If you are not a team player, the team gets rid of
you. So, the ﬁrst rule is, do not turn in a fellow colleague.
There is an environment, a culture you just get in as an
innocent but you quickly accept it. And of course you also
immediately see that the guy next to your desk at the
same position has a three times bigger car than you have
and goes to the French Riviera for holiday.” (Middle-class
respondent)5.2. Material hierarchical imperatives
Gatekeepers. The literature tends to distinguish between
two types of corrupt practices: collusion and extortion
(Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011; Mishra, 2006: 191). In the case
of extortion, the agent uses his/her authority to force the
client to pay a bribe. My ﬁndings suggest that actors who
control crucial organizational resources are able to use this
ability in an illegal market. Such resources are not neces-
sarily material ones; they can involve control over organi-
zational decisions or even non-decisions as well as
information. These acts viewed as imperatives on the client
side – since to obtain whatever actions they need from an
organization requires them to work through the corrupt
gatekeeper. Here is one example
“If you want a driving license in Hungary, it is for sure that
you have to bribe your instructor and the examiner. These
two work as a team. My colleague has just taken the
practice test. She bribed them because she did not want to
try it four or ﬁve times. If you do not pay they bring you
down… .after 30-meter-driving they just order you to pull
over and you are failed. Then you have to pay the test fee
again, so it is cheaper and easier to pay some bribe.”
(Middle-class respondent)
However, not only individuals are gatekeepers. Corpo-
rate crime is often committed for the beneﬁt of the whole
organization or a particular department, in order to obtain
contracts or reduce costs (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, &
Trevino, 2008; Brass, Butterﬁeld, & Skaggs, 1998; Clinard& Quinney, 1973; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). My in-
terviews also conﬁrmed that not only individuals but also
whole organizations can use their gatekeeper position in
order to force bribes for the organization's beneﬁt.
A young father told me this:
“Today many-many schools and even kindergartens have
their own nonproﬁt foundations in Hungary. If you pay
money to the foundation of your kids' school and they
renovate the gymnasium using that money you did
something good, something noble, right? The only problem
is that this is not voluntary. Because this is why your kid
was admitted, if you do not pre-donate the school they do
not admit your child. This is the unwritten rule; this is
extortion.” (Middle-class respondent)
A building contractor and entrepreneur provided this
story:
“I have been in several housing projects in Budapest's
wealthiest district. The district is developing rapidly; ugly
big houses have been erected there. But as a contractor you
can get a building permit from the local government only if
you let the government's own public ﬁrm build the roads
and infrastructure around your future building. But their
price is three times higher than the average market price.
The ofﬁcials at the local government do not even bother to
use a ‘secret’ language. If you go in for a permit they tell you
clearly that this is the only way to get it. The local govern-
ment simply blackmails you.” (Entrepreneur respondent)
Ordered to be corrupt. My ﬁndings conﬁrm that
organizational-level material imperatives can be also result
from hierarchical relationships when one's own organiza-
tional members force rule breaking. In such cases, actors
participate in illicit activities because their formal superiors
coerce them to act illegally. Scholars have studied what
gives rise to excessive and rigid conformity to superior
authority (Scheff, 1988). Milgram's (1974) famous experi-
ments dramatized how easily normally moral people will
undertake morally improper actions because they obey
authority ﬁgures. However, in other cases, pressure by
high-ranking corporate ofﬁcials on their employees is quite
direct, pushing the latter into illegal behavior. Here the
fundamental source of conformity is the threat of punish-
ment by superiors (Etzioni, 1961; French & Raven, 1960;
Warren, 1968). In these “crime-coercive” situations,
lower-level employees participate in rule breaking activ-
ities because of fear of being ﬁred or punished in other
ways (Needleman & Needleman, 1979).
An young HR assistant told me this story:
“My job is to collect and select the CVs the company re-
ceives. My boss told me that XY applicant is the kin of a ‘top
dog’ and we have to hire that person. I was ordered to
shortlist only very weak resumes, because, among them,
the relative would seem like a super talent. It is a clear
violation of the company's recruitment policy but what
can you do in this situation? If you do not follow such
orders you can be ﬁred very quickly. So I did it.” (Middle-
class respondent)
A retired ﬁnancial executive explained how serious the
sanctions can be:
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ment of the local government. Since he did not want to be
part of the mayor's suspicious activities he was sacked and
he was turned down from all other jobs he applied to. The
mayor reached everywhere in the town. He is a talented
young man but he has not had a job since then. What I see
is that those in power wanted a deterrent to inﬂuence the
other employees … you know, it was just like shut up for
everyone in the ofﬁce.” (Middle-class respondent)
In contrast to the gatekeeper types, where the actors
used their ability to control organizational resources and
informally forced clients to pay bribes, here the actors use
the formal power system of an organization to coerce their
own organizational members. Coercion is used to force
informal activity down the organizational hierarchy. In
most cases this shift down the hierarchy sometimes occurs
because the expertise necessary for “successful” illegal
exchanges only exists at lower layers. The knowledge of
bookkeepers, controllers, engineers and lawyers about
organizational technology is necessary to hide illegal and
corrupt deals of the bosses behind normal operation (Javor
& Jancsics, 2013). In other cases, corrupt actors with higher
status want to remain safely hidden, so they let lower level
employees take the risks and do the “dirty work.”6. Conclusion
This paper challenges the mainstream approach that
emphasizes the “moral inferiority” character in corruption
and bribery in CEE. My ﬁndings suggest that in many cases
people participate in informal organizational resource ex-
changes not because of immorality or greed but rather
because of powerful external forces. Informal practices
constitute a very complex multi-faced phenomenon that
cannot be understood simply as a result of harmful and
dysfunctional social cancer. The main contribution of this
study is that, based on rich qualitative data, it provides a
typology and a deeper insight of such imperatives. Table 2
shows the main themes, categories, and codes emerged
from the data analysis and the hierarchical relations be-
tween them.
Since the data collection of the research was not based
on representative sampling, this is obviously not a
comprehensive typology. But at minimum it reveals some
important aspects and the complexity of post-socialist
informality. I have identiﬁed two main forms of external
imperatives that force ordinary Hungarians to exchange
organizational resources informally: “macro-level impera-
tives” and “organizational-level imperatives.” Both have
several categories; some of them are normative socialTable 2
Main types of external imperatives.
Theme Macro-level imperatives
Category Universalistic norms Material structural imper
Code Consume more ‘Robin Hood’
attitude
I cannot afford not
to violate rules
Dys
post
inst
Imperative type Normative Normative Material Matforces while others are more visible material structural or
hierarchical imperatives.
Macro-level imperatives are linked to Hungary's his-
torical pathways of post-socialist institutional develop-
ment. The “consume more” category suggests that means
available to satisfy consumer demands in post-socialist
Hungary are limited. Mobility channels, typical in Western
countries, are frozen and due to the global crisis credit is not
a possible option for consumption anymore. My middle-
class respondents reported increasing willingness to use
informal practices in order to achieve the consumption
level, supposed to be appropriate for their social status.
The “Robin Hood attitude” category emerged from the
empirical data refers to the breakdown in state-society
relations in post-socialism. The ‘sense of betrayal by the
state’ is also conﬁrmed by empirical studies in other post-
socialist countries (Morris & Polese, 2014). However this
breakdown probably constitutes longer-term pathways in
Hungary. Our ﬁndings suggest that the current state-
society conﬂict in Hungary may be tracked back to earlier
periods than the 20th century's communist system. Since
the occupation of the Ottoman Empire in 16th Century
Hungarian people have experienced several foreign rulers
and alien state administrations. Therefore the state-society
conﬂict has burned deep into society's collective memory
in Hungarian.
The “dysfunctional post-socialist institutions” category
refers to signiﬁcant weaknesses of post-socialist welfare
states. The phenomenon when informal systems emerge
to compensate for the state's withdrawal from severe
welfare provisions can be found in many post-socialist
countries (Polese et al., 2014). In our Hungarian cases the
state cannot not guarantee adequate protection for public
employees or fails to provide sufﬁcient legal service. This
uncertain formal institutional context triggers informal
responses of ordinary citizens in order to reduce such
uncertainties.
The second major theme of this study, “Organizational-
level imperatives” contains imperatives that can be un-
derstood in a formal organizational context. These are non
post-communism speciﬁc external forces. As the interna-
tional literature suggests, particularistic organizational
norms are well known phenomena in Western countries
and all around the world. Redundant workers, the most
vulnerable strata of the working class who are sometimes
constrained to participate in illicit deals for their everyday
living is probably not a Central and Eastern European
specialty either. The two structural types, gatekeepers and
superiors who order rule breaking, are embedded into
organizational power structures. These phenomena can be
also found in many organizations in the world.Organizational-level imperatives
atives Particularistic norms Material hierarchical imperatives
functional
-socialist
itutions
Don't turn in an
in-group mate
Gatekeepers Ordered to be
corrupt
erial Normative Material Material
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